SCHUMAN AND ADENAUER

Schuman once seriously thought of entering the priesthood but, in his own words, 'chose to aid atheists to live rather than Christians to die'.7Some of his friends regarded him as a 'saint in a jacket', but he thought of himself as 'a very imperfect instrument of a Providence which makes use of us in accomplishing designs which go far beyond ourselves'.8 He believed in the individual direction of God. 'Often he tacked about, delayed a decision, tried to dodge the call which was making itself heard in the depths of his conscience,' wrote his close collaborator, the Socialist leader André Philip. 'Then, when he was sure what the inner voice was demanding, he took the boldest initiative and pushed it to its conclusion, equally oblivious of attacks as of threats.'9

Adenauer, too, was deeply rooted in his faith. When Hitler hounded him out of office as Lord Mayor of Cologne in 1933, he sought refuge at Maria Laach Monastery, which was presided over by an old school friend, Ildefons Herwegen; and when Hitler was overthrown he, like Schuman, was convinced that Germany and Europe could only be rebuilt on Christian foundations. He regarded the uniting of Europe as 'not only a political and economic aim worth striving for, but as a real Christian obligation'.10 He too sought God's direction in affairs - often, according to one biographer, while shaving.

Konrad Adenaur at Caux

The carrying through of the Schuman Plan was made possible by the pressure of outside events - the determination to avoid yet another war between France and Germany, and the emergence of an aggressive Soviet Union - and by the convergence of an unusual group of men who were 'kindred spirits'. Professor Henri Rieben, Director of the Jean Monnet Institute in Lausanne, used that phrase to describe Monnet and Buchman, who never, in fact, met. Buchman, he said, had 'geo-political diagnosis plus inspiration', and did on a spiritual level what Monnet did on a political level.11 The same phrase can be used even more certainly to describe Buchman, Schuman and Adenauer,12 despite the fact that the last two sometimes doubted each other. Each played an essential part, sometimes together, often independently. As far as Buchman was concerned, he had once more been led to people whom he could assist, by word and action, to make their highest hopes come true.

Adenauer had first been attracted by Buchman's open-hearted reception of the Germans at Caux which, in Reinhold Maier's words, 'ended the moral outlawry of Germany'.13 At Caux itself, Adenauer was impressed that 'people have the courage to stand for good and for God and that each begins with himself '14-a point he was to reiterate. Finally, 'the great success' of Buchman's work in the Ruhr was to convince him of Moral Re-Armament's effectiveness. That work, too, was a prerequisite of Franco-German rapprochement. As the Neue Zürcher Zeitung wrote in 1959: 'The Ruhr, instead of being the apple of discord for Europe, has become the growing point of international agreement. . . Without the Ruhr, no High Authority;* without the High Authority, no Common Market and no far-reaching plan for European integration.'15

(* The governing body set up under the Schuman Plan.)

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Photo: Konrad Adenauer (centre) at the Caux assembly, September 1948, where he asked Buchman to work in Germany. On the right is Oskar Leimgruber, Chancellor of the Swiss Confederation.
©Arthur Strong/MRA Productions